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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 13-2028
___________
WALTER BROWN,
Appellant
v.
WARDEN MONICA RECKTENWALD; ACTING WARDEN JEFF BUTLER
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-12-cv-01135)
District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 9, 2013
Before: RENDELL, GREENAWAY, JR., and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: December 10, 2013)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Walter Brown, an inmate incarcerated at FCI-Allenwood, appeals from the District
Court’s order denying his application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2241. We will affirm.

In August 2011, a search of the six-man cell Brown shared with five other inmates
revealed a homemade weapon, fashioned from a sharpened toothbrush, hidden under the
sink in the common area of the cell. Brown was assigned to the cell six days prior to the
search. Brown and his cellmates were charged with possession, manufacture or
introduction of a weapon, in violation of Section 104 of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”)
disciplinary code.1 In response to the charges, Brown waived staff representation and
witness testimony and made the following statement: “It’s not mine.” Following an
investigation and hearing, the Disciplinary Hearing Officer (“DHO”) credited the
officer’s report of the incident over Brown’s statement and concluded that the greater
weight of evidence supported finding Brown guilty of the weapons violation. Brown was
sanctioned with sixty days of disciplinary segregation, disallowance of thirty days of
good conduct time, forfeiture of one hundred days of non-vested good conduct time, a six
month loss of telephone and visiting privileges, and a monetary fine of $101.00.
Brown then filed a § 2241 petition, specifically challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence against him. The District Court denied his petition and subsequent motion for
reconsideration. Brown timely appealed.2

1

An affidavit executed by the Disciplinary Hearing Officer indicated that all inmates
assigned to the cell were found guilty of the charge.
2

The District Court did not comply with the separate order rule set forth in Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 58(a). Therefore, Brown had 150 days in which to file his notice of
appeal. It was timely filed on April 8, 2013, seventy-six days after the District Court’s
order denying his § 2241 petition was entered on January 22, 2013.
2

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(e). A challenge to a
disciplinary action resulting in the loss of good conduct time is properly brought pursuant
to § 2241, “as the action could affect the duration of the petitioner’s sentence.” Queen v.
Miner, 530 F.3d 253, 254 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008). We review the denial of habeas corpus
relief de novo, exercising plenary review over the District Court’s legal conclusions and
applying a clearly erroneous standard to its findings of fact. Denny v. Schultz, 708 F.3d
140, 143 (3d Cir. 2013). We review the denial of a motion for reconsideration for an
abuse of discretion. Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010).
A prisoner has a liberty interest in good time credits. Denny, 708 F.3d at 143. In
evaluating prisoners’ due process rights, courts must be sensitive to the “intricate
balancing of prison management concerns with prisoners’ liberty.” Id. at 144 (quoting
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 478 (1995)). The Supreme Court has held that
“revocation of good time does not comport with the minimum requirements of procedural
due process unless the findings of the prison disciplinary board are supported by some
evidence in the record.”3 Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). The Hill standard is minimal and does not require
examination of the entire record, an independent assessment of the credibility of
witnesses, or even a weighing of the evidence. See Thompson v. Owens, 889 F.2d 500,

3

It is undisputed that Brown was provided with (1) written notice of the charges at least
twenty-four hours prior to any hearing, (2) an opportunity to call witnesses and present
evidence in his defense, and (3) a written statement of the evidence relied on and the
reasons for the disciplinary action. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-66 (1974).
3

502 (3d Cir. 1989). The relevant inquiry is whether “there is any evidence in the record
that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Hill, 472 U.S. at
455-56.
Brown challenged the sufficiency of the evidence against him.4 The District
Court, relying on Hill, determined that the DHO’s decision was supported by some
evidence of possession, which was sufficient to uphold a revocation of good time credits.
Although there was no direct evidence of Brown’s guilt, the District Court reasoned that
the “some evidence” standard was satisfied by application of the constructive possession
doctrine. That is, “in the absence of direct evidence” to prove an inmate’s guilt of
possession, the some evidence standard “may be satisfied where a small number of
inmates are potentially guilty of the offense charged.” White v. Kane, 860 F. Supp. 1075,
1079 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1994), aff’d, 52 F.3d 319 (3d Cir. 1995). The District Court
concluded that, because none of the six inmates assigned to the cell claimed
responsibility for the homemade weapon, there was “some evidence” to support the
DHO’s decision under the doctrine of constructive possession. (Dkt. No. 11, pp. 10-11.)
We agree with the District Court. As we recently explained in Denny, “the
discovery of contraband in a shared cell constitutes ‘some evidence’ of possession
sufficient to uphold a prison disciplinary sanction against each inmate in the cell,
including depriving that inmate of his or her liberty interest in good time credits.” 708

4

Brown does not address Denny on appeal.
4

F.3d at 145; see also Flowers v. Anderson, 661 F.3d 977, 980-81 (8th Cir. 2011) (relying
on collective responsibility theory whereby each inmate was collectively culpable for two
homemade weapons found in shared eight-man cell); Hamilton v. O’Leary, 976 F.2d 341,
345 (7th Cir. 1992) (“The proposition that constructive possession provides ‘some
evidence’ of guilt when contraband is found where only a few inmates have access is
unproblematical.”). In this case, the contraband homemade weapon was found under the
sink in Brown’s cell, which was shared with five other inmates. We cannot say that the
District Court erred in denying his habeas petition, as it was under no obligation to
examine the entire record or even weigh the evidence. Thompson, 889 F.3d at 502.
Brown was one of a handful of inmates who had access to the area where the weapon was
found. That constitutes some evidence of constructive possession (enough to support the
DHO’s conclusion), and that is all that is required under Hill to satisfy due process. See
id. (“The due process requirements in this context are minimal, and they are met here.”)
Nor did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying Brown’s motion for
reconsideration.5
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the decision of the District Court.6

5

Brown’s motion to supplement the record is denied as unnecessary because he already
made the arguments contained therein to the District Court in his motion for
reconsideration, and we will affirm the denial of that motion.
6

We agree with the District Court that Brown’s arguments pertaining to the conditions of
his confinement could be pursued through the filing of a Bivens action, (Dkt. No. 11, p.7
n.5), and similarly express no opinion on the merits of such an action.
5

